Existence of God :: Ontological arguments

The difficulty of the presence of God has grieved humankind for a huge number of years. Numerous logicians have advanced their speculations so as to demonstrate the presence of God. A large portion of these contentions can be named as ontological. These contentions vary from different contentions for the presence of God since they are not founded on experimental information, for example, the presence or nature of the universe, yet are fairly grounded in unadulterated rationale. First we will consider the contentions introduced by Anselm. He accepted that God is ‘that than which nothing more prominent can be conceived’; in the event that one get this, at that point God exists in his brain; however it is more noteworthy to exist in all actuality just as in the psyche than to exist just in the brain; accordingly, something that exists just in the brain isn't ‘that than which nothing more prominent can be conceived’; consequently, God exists as a general rule also. Anselm additionally puts this another way: we can imagine a being that can't be considered not to exist; such a being is more noteworthy than one that can be imagined not to exist; thusly the best possible being can't be imagined not to exist; along these lines, the best possible being exists. This contention seems to presume that something taking after the conventional mystical God exists †in contrast to the cosmological and teleological contentions, which appear to be limited to a maker and an originator individually. This contention was quickly censured by Gaunilo, who contended that equal thinking could be applied to demonstrate the presence of an ideal island. This is a decrease of Anselm’s position: it demonstrates it to have ludicrous outcomes. Be that as it may, it isn't evident that there is a cognizant idea of the ideal island to begin with: what number of palm trees is the ideal number? Anselm’s own answer appears to recognize the ideal island †which is an ideal case of one sort of thing †from the ideal being †which is an ideal case of a thing, with no limitation to kind. It is no ideals, greatness, flawlessness of an island qua island that it exists, however it is a goodness, greatness, flawlessness of a being that it exists, so the contention works just for the idea of an ideal being. The greater analysis is the one Kant required at Descartes’s adaptation of the contention, yet applies similarly to Anselm’s. It is that presence is definitely not an extraordinary creation nature of a being, on the grounds that it's anything but a nature of a being by any means; in Kant’s terms ‘existence is certainly not a genuine predicate’.